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Faith plays a valuable role in sustaining relationships through various kinds 
of challenges, including through evidentially unfavorable circumstances and 
periods of significant doubt. But if, as is widely assumed, both faith in God 
and faith that God exists require belief that God exists, and if one’s beliefs 
are properly responsive to one’s evidence, the capacity for faith to persevere 
amidst significant and well-grounded doubt will be fairly limited. Taking 
Mother Teresa as an exemplar of Christian faith and exploring the close con-
nection between faith and faithfulness in the context of committed covenantal 
relationships, I set out a view of Relational Faith that does not assume that 
faith requires belief and allows wide room for honestly wrestling with doubt 
from within the Judeo-Christian tradition.
1. Introduction
Assessments of the value of faith differ widely and, unsurprisingly, are 
highly dependent on what one takes faith to be. Where “faith” functions 
primarily as a conversation stopper in response to legitimate requests for 
evidence, it looks more like a vice than a virtue. There is more agreement, 
perhaps, that there is an important and valuable place for faith in ordinary 
interpersonal relationships—in marriage, in friendship, and all kinds of 
social relations.1 But even here faith can be a puzzling phenomenon. It is 
relatively easy to place your trust in someone when you have great reason 
to be confident that they are reliable and know that they are there for you. 
Yet those are the circumstances in which it is least clear that faith is needed 
or that there is a distinctive role for faith to play.
My topic concerns the nature and value of religious faith and I want 
to approach this issue by reflecting on the value of perseverance in faith 
through periods of significant doubt. Not all religions call for faith or 
assign it equal importance. I will focus on the tradition that I know best, 
1Preston-Roedder, “Faith in Humanity”; and Rice, McKaughan, and Howard-Snyder 
“Approaches to Faith.”
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Christianity—though much of what I say could apply with only minor 
modifications at least to other Abrahamic traditions such as Judaism and 
Islam. In my view, what is most valuable and philosophically interesting 
about faith is most apparent amidst life’s challenges and uncertainties. I 
will argue that faith and doubt are compatible in a way and to an extent 
that belief and doubt are not and, consequently, that there is a lot more 
room to wrestle honestly with doubt from within these traditions than is 
often appreciated. In Section 2, I explain why I find a prevailing approach 
to trying to understand faith to be superficial and problematic, and then 
sketch an alternative framework for identifying faith as a particular kind 
of stance. I then consider two distinctive views about the nature of faith 
in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 considers Mother Teresa as an exemplar of 
faith and presents doubt as a problem for what I call the Belief Plus view 
of faith. Section 6 illustrates the valuable role that the form of Relational 
Faith I defend can play in helping relationships to persist in the midst of 
challenges and also the far greater extent to which it is compatible with 
doubt.
2. Identifying the Phenomenon with a Rough Initial Profile of Faith
One of the goals of philosophy of religion should be to understand various 
religious and non-religious forms of life in a deep way. I see a problem 
here with typical approaches to faith. We’ve become accustomed to di-
viding people into three familiar categories, theist, atheist, and agnostic, 
according to whether they believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment that 
God (as characterized in classical theism) exists. It’s often assumed that 
religious affiliation lines up neatly with belief. In many Christian com-
munities, the question “Are you a believer?” has become a kind of marker 
for identifying oneself and others as Christians. I worry that this invites 
a distressingly shallow view of faith and, just as importantly, what I take 
to be the mistaken assumption that faith requires belief. Let me explain.
Many of us are aware that our religious lives, and associated attitudes, 
are often more complex than this trichotomy suggests—sometimes in 
ways that are acknowledged within the sacred texts of our traditions. 
Consider Daemon. Daemon, let us suppose, fully believes that God exists 
and yet is entirely indifferent (or even averse) to this state of affairs (along 
the lines of James 2:9). Asked to consider the central content of the gospel, 
Daemon responds coldly: “Yes, but what of it?”—he does “not love [God] 
at all, nor even try to, nor trust him at all, nor pray to him, nor adore him.”2 
“Such a person,” H. H. Price writes, “might as well be an atheist. Perhaps 
there is even a sense in which he is an atheist, despite the strength of his 
theistic convictions.”3
Contrast Daemon with Ariel, a college student who loves God and has 
given her life to Jesus, but now finds herself in a sea of doubt. Her study 
2Price, “Faith and Belief,” 9.
3Price, “Faith and Belief,” 9.
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of science, philosophy, historical criticism of the Bible, and world religions 
has surfaced a lot of pointed questions about the religious tradition in 
which she was raised. Some of the unpleasant exchanges that she has had 
in internet chatrooms, combined with her mom’s struggle with cancer and 
the suicide of her best friend, have shaken what she has taken to be the 
foundations of her Christian commitment to her core. She finds it hard 
to see through the glass even darkly (1 Cor 13:12), but continues to set 
her heart on Jesus and cleaves firmly to the promises of the gospel. But, 
for some time now Ariel has been in serious doubt. When she is honest 
with herself she finds herself thinking that it is more likely that death is 
the end. She is unable to believe that Jesus was raised and that there is a 
God who will someday wipe away all her tears. Let’s be clear that there 
is a difference between failing to believe that p is true and believing not-p 
(i.e., that p is false). Ariel fails to believe that God exists. But she does 
not flat-out believe that God does not exist or that death is the end, nor 
is she intellectually committed to that. Her evidence remains ambiguous 
enough for her to continue to entertain the good news as a live possibility. 
Moreover, Ariel recognizes that, if there is a God who created us and loves 
us, living in relation to God is among the highest of goods there could be. 
She has not given up hope and she still lives more or less as she did when 
she strongly believed that God exists. She still feels a deep longing for 
God and continues not just to participate in public worship and prayer 
but also to seek God earnestly and with a sense of urgency, as Price says, 
“inwardly,” in her own heart.
Can we conclude, ah well, that’s tough: Daemon is a theist and Ariel is 
an agnostic, or maybe even an atheist, and leave it at that? A philosopher 
who does say that will be missing out on a lot that is crucial for under-
standing what it is to have religious faith. Here we begin to see just how 
unilluminating the question “Are you a believer?” is as a window into the 
state of one’s spiritual life.
What exactly, or even approximately, is faith—as faith is understood in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition? When we look at a complex phenomenon 
like faith, I find it helpful to use what I call a “CAB” analysis, attending 
to the cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects that the complex stance of 
faith/faithfulness involves. By asking questions such as “What is distinc-
tive or characteristic about what one thinks, what one cares about, and what 
one does when one has faith or is in a relationship in which faith plays a 
central role?” we can work toward a cluster of criteria that give us a rough 
profile of faith.4 Christian faith typically involves both faith in a person (as 
4Rather than treating these criteria as necessary and sufficient conditions, I understand 
faith as a family resemblance or cluster concept that allows for various kinds of departures 
from paradigm cases. Moreover, strengths in one dimension can compensate for a significant 
lack in others. Our present focus is on cases of intellectual doubt. However, this way of 
characterizing faith allows that, just as one might lean on one’s affection for God or a resolute 
commitment to continue to engage in relevant voluntary actions to weather periods of doubt, 
strong cognitive judgements (such as confident belief or resolute acceptance) might combine 
with relatively weak affective or behavioral dispositions to fit faith’s profile in distinctive 
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something or other, e.g., having faith in Jesus as Messiah, as Lord, or as 
a carpenter or fluent speaker of Aramaic, but perhaps not as a Pharisee) 
and propositional faith (faith that something is the case, e.g., that God exists 
or other salient content). Paradigm cases of both of these types of faith 
involve some sort of positive cognitive attitude and positive affective-
evaluative attitude toward the person or content that is the object of one’s 
faith, and various relevant behaviors, each of these three aspects of which 
is disposed to what Daniel Howard-Snyder calls “resilience” in the face of 
challenges.5
In my view, much of what is most central to the response of faith can 
be located in the realm of action (as discussed in Section 4). But consider, 
first, the positive affective or evaluative aspect of faith. Having faith in a 
person, involves valuing, endorsing, or having affections appropriate to-
ward them. Similarly, someone who has faith that God exists or that God 
will be faithful to such and such promises will care about whether the proposi-
tions in question are true, will want them to be the case, or will consider 
the truth of these propositions or the obtaining of these states of affairs to 
be good or desirable. For example, one reason to think that Daemon lacks 
faith in God is that he lacks a positive affective or evaluative orientation 
toward God. He believes that God exists, but does not value or revere 
God. He doesn’t take God’s existence to be a particularly good thing and 
he feels no affection for God. He is indifferent.
Second, faith often involves some sort of positive cognitive stance on the 
truth of relevant propositions. For the sake of clarity, let’s take care to dis-
tinguish content and attitudes here. Christianity has content in the sense that 
it represents reality as being a certain way. It has a stake in some particular 
claims about reality: the basic Christian proclamation, or kerygma, includes 
or presupposes claims such as that God exists, that Jesus was raised from 
the dead, and so on. I will refer to such content, as the core or salient content 
of Christianity. Don’t confuse a subject’s psychological state (propositional 
attitudes like believing, desiring, or being afraid that p) with the proposi-
tional content ( p) or with truth ( p actually being the case). If claims that are 
part of the essential content of Christianity are false (if they fail to match 
reality), then Christianity is false (mistaken, incorrect). With respect to 
ways. The approach thus places substantive constraints on what counts as faith, allowing for 
clear cases on both sides, while also leaving quite a bit of latitude for accommodating cases 
of faith in the midst of severe depression or other sorts of spiritual struggles (such as cases 
of low affection or deficiencies in pro-attitudes relevant toward persistence), acceptance of a 
doctrine as an article of faith that one doesn’t regard as a good thing (e.g., that hell is popu-
lated), or physical paralysis (which might severely limit the expression of faith in outward 
behavior while not precluding a flourishing interior faith). An account sensitive to these and 
other possibilities may be particularly relevant for the characterization of faith in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, where faith is clearly thought of as something that comes in degrees, and 
even people who are held up as paradigms of faith in scripture are noteworthy for the ways 
that they fail, struggle, and falter, in just the ways that we understand that even deep and 
sustained relationships can.
5Howard-Snyder, “Propositional Faith”; Howard-Snyder, “Markan Faith”; McKaughan, 
“Action-Centered Faith”; and McKaughan, “On the Value of Faith and Faithfulness.”
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content, I am taking for granted a kind of theological realism, in contrast 
to a religious fictionalism which either denies or is indifferent to the reality 
of God, as part of the discussion. As the Apostle Paul says, “If Christ has 
not been raised, then our proclamation has been in vain and your faith has 
been in vain” (1 Cor 15:14).
The focus of our present discussion of faith and its relationship to doubt 
is not about what the content of Christianity is but rather on what range 
of attitudes or psychological state types one can have toward that content and 
still have Christian faith.
With this rough profile of faith before us, let’s now contrast two more 
specific views about what Christian faith is.
3. Faith as Belief Plus?
Christian faith clearly involves more than believing. But does it involve 
at least that? According to one widely held view of faith, which I call the 
Belief Plus view, whatever else faith involves, faith requires belief. In order 
to satisfy the cognitive aspect of faith, a person must be in a particular cog-
nitive psychological state: only believing will do. More precisely, the Belief 
Plus view claims that S can have Christian faith only if S believes its salient 
content.6 Belief of the salient content is necessary both for propositional 
faith in the salient content and for any faith in a person which presup-
poses the salient content.
We can see the implications that this view has for Ariel. Ariel has the 
positive affective/evaluative orientation and the positive behavioral orien-
tation needed for faith. But, to her sorrow, the serious intellectual doubts 
she is confronting leave her without belief. Does this entail that she lacks 
faith? She couldn’t have faith on the Belief Plus view. Believing is surely 
one attitude that can serve as the positive cognitive attitude involved in 
faith. But I reject the claim that only believing will do. I see a failure of 
imagination here. And I intend to argue for the perhaps surprising claim 
that someone like Ariel can still have Christian faith.
It is difficult to assess the Belief Plus view unless we are told what be-
lieving amounts to. Roughly, we might say that for you to believe that p is 
for you to have a tendency for p to seem to be true when you consider it—
for you to feel confident about it. For example, you believe that 7 + 5 = 12 
and that there are other people. A majority of philosophers today think of 
belief and doubt as largely passive, involuntary psychological states that 
we simply find ourselves in. If you have a toothache, or see an oncoming 
truck on the highway veering into your lane, you can’t just decide not to 
believe these things. Beliefs are not typically under our direct voluntary 
control. But philosophers have attempted to define belief in a dizzying 
6For recent defenses of such a thesis see Radcliffe, “Nondoxastic Faith”; Malcolm and 
Scott, “Faith, Belief and Fictionalism”; and Mugg, “In Defense of the Belief-Plus Model of 
Faith.” For critical discussion see McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk”; 
McKaughan, “Action-Centered Faith”; and McKaughan, “On the Value of Faith and Faithful-
ness.”
200 Faith and Philosophy
variety of ways.7 This presents a problem, because if I simply assume one 
of those particular definitions for the purposes of discussion, the sly pro-
ponent of the Belief Plus view might well say, that’s all very well but that’s 
not how I think about belief.
Fortunately, there is a way around this potential impasse. All I need to 
run my objections to the Belief Plus view is the concept of being in serious 
doubt—cases in which the doubt is so significant as to preclude belief on 
just about any plausible understanding of belief.8 Let me specify the sort 
of doubt I intend to focus on more precisely. For you to doubt that p might 
mean at least three different things.9 First, it might mean merely that you 
are uncertain about p. Belief does not require certainty, so we should 
allow that it is compatible with some degree of doubt. (Some zealous 
theologians and philosophers have insisted that Christian faith requires 
not just belief but knowledge or certainty or really high confidence of the 
salient content, but let’s set that suggestion aside.) Second, at the other 
extreme, for you to doubt that p might mean that you believe that not-p 
(disbelieve p). That’s incompatible with belief that p. Neither of those are 
what I have in view. My focus is on a third idea—being in doubt about 
whether p—cases where one neither believes that p nor believes that 
not-p. But I am using the qualifiers “serious” or “significant” to indicate 
that I don’t mean to include only situations in which a person thinks that 
it is, say, roughly equally probable that God exists. Ariel is in serious 
doubt when, although Christianity remains a live possibility for her, she 
finds herself thinking that naturalism is more likely given her evidence. 
Where one’s serious or significant doubts are well-grounded, rational 
belief is precluded.10
7McKaughan, Toward a Richer Vocabulary for Epistemic Attitudes; and McKaughan and 
Elliott “Introduction.”
8Whereas many would maintain that one couldn’t believe that p if one’s probability for p 
was less than 0.5, a focus on serious doubt can also be used to preclude belief in the contras-
tive sense described by Richard Swinburne in Faith and Reason, 5–7. To illustrate, consider 
a group of competing football teams. You might think that the Patriots aren’t very likely 
to win the Super Bowl next year (maybe you take them to have just a 20% chance). But if 
you thought that it was more likely that they would win than any of the relevant competi-
tors—that the Patriots are more likely to win than that the Seahawks will win (15%), or that 
the Steelers will (10%), or that the Browns will win (1%)—there may be a sense in which we 
might be willing to attribute belief that the Patriots will win next year, even though you think 
that they are still not likely to win overall.
9Howard-Snyder, “Propositional Faith”; see also Moon, “The Nature of Doubt.”
10In “Action-Centered Faith” I argue that, given the certain sorts of sets of values and 
affections, one can have faith that is epistemically and practically rational for any non-zero 
probability that one assigns to God’s existence so long as one does not regard the possibility 
as negligible (i.e., so long as one refuses to ignore the possibility in one’s deliberations and 
actions). With respect to epistemic rationality, evidence against God’s existence will lower 
a rational agent’s personal probability for God’s existence. As long as (1) your probability 
is non-zero in such a way that you can see the possibility that God exists as a live option or 
take it seriously and (2) you also value a potential relationship with God far more than the 
alternatives you take to be relevant (such as the rejection of anything supernatural), a com-
mitment to God can be rational. I here focus on cases in which faith is arguably compatible 
with having serious doubts that could include such attitudes as believing that naturalism is 
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As part of this discussion about faith and doubt, we do well to bear in 
mind just how provocative and striking the central claims of Christianity 
are. The Apostle Paul freely acknowledges the scandal of the cross—the 
fantastic quality that he calls the “foolishness of our proclamation” of a 
crucified and risen Messiah (1 Cor 1:18–31). That’s not the sort of thing that 
happens every day, folks. Nor is it what Jews had expected of a Messiah. 
These are untameably wild claims—about matters that do not strike Ariel 
as plausible, everyday events. We should not be at all surprised to find 
examples of people, even people of faith, who find themselves in serious 
doubt.
What other options might be available to Ariel? Are there really no 
other ways of embracing, receiving, affirming, assenting to, or champi-
oning the central proclamation? Is there a way Ariel can remain honest 
in her doubt while undertaking to continue to live in relation to God—a 
way of responding that, given Ariel’s evidential situation, we might expect 
to be just what God would desire of her (if there is a God)? Even in the 
absence of belief there are a variety of other positive cognitive attitudes that 
could accompany or constitute the cognitive aspect of her faith response. 
Ariel might, for example, resolve to accept that God exists or to assume that 
the gospel is true, making a commitment for which she is willing to live 
and die, despite what she sees as the risk of being mistaken. Or she might 
decide to place her trust in Jesus or to rely on the testimony of his followers 
and, on that basis to trust in or rely on the gospel message they proclaim. 
Even a profound hope that God exists might be sufficient to ground or to 
initiate and sustain a person in Christian faith.
She might recover the Old English meaning of the word “believe,” 
pledging her love, loyalty, and allegiance to Jesus as Lord or cherishing God 
and holding God dear, connotations all but lost to philosophers today. The 
Latin word credo was distinguished from opinion—opinio (n. opinion, be-
lief, supposition) and opinor (v. to be of the opinion, to believe). Credo is 
a compound of cor, cordis, “heart” and -do, -dere, “to put” derived from 
the proto Indo-European root for placing one’s heart upon something, 
*kred-dhē. Credo literally means “I set my heart on” the person, object, or 
doctrines in question.11
4. Relational Faith
My approach to understanding what Christian faith is does not take the 
question “What do you believe?,” at least in the modern sense of “be-
lieving,” as a focus or even as a starting point. The writings of the Greek 
New Testament use words in the pistis-pisteúō group to present faith as the 
more likely than theism (and hence that it is more likely false that God exists than true). But 
one might find the Belief Plus model unacceptable while not wanting to go so far. There is 
also room for proponents of non-doxastic approaches to advocate a middle view, on which 
faith does not require belief, but it is not compatible with all of the forms of strong doubt I 
entertain.
11McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk.”
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central response that God is said to desire of humans. But what sort of re-
sponse is God said to desire? Can it really be that what is so important is a 
particular psychological state, belief—a state which is for the most part not 
under our direct voluntary control? Why would God, or anyone else, care 
so much about that? And if God does care so much about that, why remain 
so hidden, silent, and ambiguous? Why not provide, as Bertrand Russell 
once requested, more evidence? In my view, what is most fundamental 
to and precious about faith is to be sought in what Ariel has and Daemon 
lacks rather than the other way around. Perhaps the questions “Who do 
you rely on?” and “To whom have you pledged your allegiance?” take us 
more quickly to the heart of the concerns that I take to underlie the sort of 
faith that was of most direct interest to biblical authors.
What is envisioned is a life-orienting response and commitment to 
remaining engaged in a relationship centered upon God. The view of Re-
lational Faith that I defend understands faith as perseverance in a covenantal 
relationship with God. To be clear at the outset, nothing in the account 
of Relational Faith, my use of the term “relationship,” or “response,” or 
indeed anything in this paper presupposes that God does (or does not) 
exist. If God does not exist, there is no relationship and insofar as faith 
is a response it would be a response to something other than God (e.g., 
other people’s claims that there is a God or particular experiences misin-
terpreted as encounters with God, etc.). The account of faith is focused on 
what would remain in either case: the complex of actions and whatever 
psychological attitudes underlie them that constitute a person’s (perhaps 
mistaken) attempt to relate to God, with a particular interest in the shape 
such a response can take when the existence of the person toward whom 
such faith is directed is in question.
I take paradigm cases of Judeo-Christian faith typically to involve two 
core forms of personal response: to have Christian faith is (1) to trust in or 
rely on Jesus and/or God and (2) to pledge one’s allegiance to Jesus and/or 
to God. I intend this first aspect, trust and reliance, to pick out the kind of 
turning toward God and entrusting oneself to God’s care that God is said 
to desire of humans as a proper response to God’s pistos (faithfulness). My 
use of “allegiance” in the second aspect is shorthand to refer to a steadfast 
commitment or fidelity to Jesus and/or to God—to following Jesus and/
or to walking in God’s ways. Notice that Daemon’s belief does not lead 
him to respond with acts of repentance, engagement, following Jesus or 
walking in God’s ways.
“Allegiance” also, fittingly enough, has connotations intended to 
remind us that in ancient Hebrew faith and faithfulness are closely associ-
ated. Hebrew vocabulary for faith and faithfulness derives from the stem 
’mn, from which we get the English affirmation amen, “so be it, truly.” 
Faith is a person’s “yes” to God. The noun ʾĕmûnâ typically emphasizes 
“faithfulness, fidelity, trustworthiness, steadfastness,” but can also mean 
“faith, trust” (Hbk 2:4). The verb for faith, ’aman, takes on the connotation 
of standing firm in trust or in loyalty/fidelity depending on how the verb 
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is conjugated. Deuteronomy 7:9, for example, presents God as trustworthy 
in covenantal relations—as “the faithful (ne’ĕmān) God who maintains 
covenant loyalty with those who love him and keep his commandments, 
to a thousand generations.” And God is said to desire that people respond 
by trusting in or relying upon Him as trustworthy and dependable—by 
holding firmly to or to being securely set on (he’emin) God.12
Notice that both a decision to rely on someone and a decision to follow 
or to pledge one’s allegiance to a person are actions or can be initiated and 
sustained by voluntary actions. The kind of ordinary human relationship 
which the biblical authors most often use to illustrate faith and faithful-
ness is marriage, understood as a sacred covenantal relationship.13 Mother 
Teresa, for example, made a personal vow to God in 1942. She, like other 
nuns in the Missionaries of Charity, took herself to have entered into a 
sacred relationship with Jesus, akin to marriage. This promise to remain 
engaged as a “spouse of Jesus crucified” gave her faith relationship an 
anchor as she was tossed about on the dark sea of doubt and various other 
kinds of adversity she faced along life’s way. As we shall see, her resolve 
in honoring this promise to continually rely on and to remain loyal to God 
was a source of resilience that sustained her faith in the midst of experiences 
of significant doubt of a depth and variety that are incompatible with be-
lief. More than seventeen years after taking her vow, she wrote:
Since then I have kept this promise—and when sometimes the darkness is 
very dark—& I am on the verge of saying “No to God” the thought of that 
promise pulls me up.14
Just as in a marriage relationship, at its best, one can remain committed 
to one’s spouse through good times and bad times and the waxing and 
waning of one’s momentary passions and desires, one can be committed to 
cultivating and maintaining a relationship with God/Jesus in a way that is 
not simply dependent on the ups and downs of either belief or desire and 
one can resolve to remain actively and faithfully engaged in a long term 
relationship even if one comes to doubt God’s existence or faithfulness.
It is easy to see why relationships characterized by Relational Faith can 
be worth having and why this sort of response would be one that God is 
said to desire. Words used to characterize faith/faithfulness in the Judeo-
Christian tradition—like “allegiance,” “fidelity,” “loyalty,” “stability,” 
“reliability,” “steadfastness”—direct our attention to the quality that 
makes faith so valuable. As Daniel Howard-Snyder has argued, what is 
precious about faith is that it gives relationships resilience in the face of dif-
ficulties.15 The value of this resilience, this steadfastness and perseverance 
12McKaughan, “On the Value of Faith and Faithfulness.”
13McKaughan, “On the Value of Faith and Faithfulness.”
14Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 187.
15Howard-Snyder, “Propositional Faith.”
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that makes faith so desirable and worth having in relationships, shows 
itself most clearly in circumstances of difficulty, risk, and uncertainty.
Regrettably, proponents of the Belief Plus view often neglect to say much 
about what the “Plus” might involve. But suppose they say the following:
Ditto. We agree with everything, or almost everything, that you just 
said. Thanks for filling in what we might mean by the “Plus.” Maybe 
that stuff even gets to the heart of what is most fundamental to faith. 
But we proponents of the Belief Plus view differ chiefly with respect to 
the cognitive component, where we insist that only belief will do.
One way forward in the discussion is to turn to questions about the range 
of circumstances under which it could be both valuable and rational to 
have either of these kinds of faith.
5. Mother Teresa and the Problem of Doubt
Notice that the Belief Plus and Relational views of faith have very different 
consequences for how we think about the relationship between faith and 
doubt.
On the Belief Plus view, since belief is compatible with only a fairly lim-
ited range of doubt or uncertainty, faith is compatible with only a limited 
range of doubts. If a person is in serious doubt about whether p, then she 
does not believe that p. And if, as the Belief Plus view maintains, a person 
does not believe that p, then she cannot have faith which presupposes p 
as part of its salient content. It follows that if a person is in serious doubt 
about whether p, she cannot have faith which presupposes p as part of its 
salient content. People who, like Ariel, find themselves with significant 
doubts will be unable to respond to God in faith for reasons of intellectual 
honesty, regardless of how much they love Jesus, desire to give their lives 
to God, or choose to live.
Serious doubt is a problem for the Belief Plus view. The problem is 
that the Belief Plus view seems unable to accommodate the apparent 
coexistence of faith with serious doubt in the lived experience of many 
Christians. Contrary to the Belief Plus view, it very much seems that robust 
faith in God, undergirded by hope or trust that there is a God, sometimes 
fiercely coexists with extensive doubt in people whose lives are fraught 
with trouble, tragedy, and loss—doubts serious enough as to be incompat-
ible with belief. Suppose we formulate the Problem of Doubt in this way:
(1) If someone can have Christian faith only if she believes salient con-
tent (e.g., that God exists), then there are no cases in which some-
one has Christian faith in the absence of belief of salient content.
(2) But there are cases in which someone has Christian faith in the ab-
sence of belief of salient content.
(3) So, it is not the case that someone can have Christian faith only if 
she believes salient content.
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Proponents of the Belief Plus view are committed to premise (1). The con-
clusion follows from (1) and (2) by modus tollens. And we have some really 
good candidates for premise (2), including—as we shall see—Mother Te-
resa. Perhaps premise (2) isn’t obvious to all? Proponents of the Belief Plus 
view must reject premise (2), which is just what you might expect given 
how they define faith. The Problem of Doubt turns on pointing to counter-
examples to the Belief Plus view: cases in which someone arguably has 
faith that p and yet lacks belief that p.
Mother Teresa, now known in the Catholic Church as Saint Teresa of 
Calcutta, is widely admired for the seriousness with which she attempted 
to live out the good and noble teachings of Micah 6:8 to “do justice, to 
love mercy, to walk humbly with thy God” and Jesus’s central call to love 
God and neighbor in concrete and meaningful ways. She left behind her 
worldly possessions to serve the poor, downtrodden, and marginalized. 
She touched the untouchables, cared for lepers, provided hospice care to 
the dying, and rescued infants who had been left on the street to die.
Saint Teresa is arguably one of the great exemplars of Christian faith 
in the twentieth century. Let’s take a closer look at her lived experience of 
faith. It would be easy to assume that behind her smile lay serene untrou-
bled confident belief. But if you did assume that, you would be mistaken. 
We have her letters. Excerpts from her private writings, made public in 
Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, reveal her complicated interior life which 
combine haunting expressions of doubts so serious that she regards them 
as blasphemous with a firm resolve to remain faithful to her commitment 
to God and to Jesus. She writes the following:
Did I make the mistake in surrendering blindly to the call of the Sacred 
Heart? . . . The whole time smiling—Sisters & people pass such remarks.—
They think my faith, trust & love are filling my very being & that the inti-
macy with God and union to His will must be absorbing my heart.—Could 
they but know—and how my cheerfulness is the cloak by which I cover the 
emptiness & misery. In spite of all—this darkness & emptiness is not as pain-
ful as the longing for God.—The contradiction I fear will unbalance me.16
In 1937, while still a Sister at Loreto, she wrote: “Do not think that my 
spiritual life is strewn with roses—that is the flower which I hardly ever 
find on my way. Quite the contrary, I have more often as my companion 
‘darkness.’”17 Her letters in the years to follow describe a “terrible darkness 
within me” from the time she left the Loreto convent in 1949 to serve on 
the streets in the slums of Calcutta continuing until her death in 1997—a 
period of some five decades during which she felt abandoned by God.18 As 
she wrote in an undated letter, probably from 1961:
16Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 187.
17Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 20.
18Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 149.
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Since [19]49 or [19]50 this terrible sense of loss—this untold darkness—this 
loneliness this continual longing for God—which gives me that pain deep 
down in my heart—Darkness is such that I really do not see—neither with 
my mind nor with my reason—the place of God in my soul is blank—There 
is no God in me—when the pain of longing is so great—I just long & long 
for God—and then it is that I feel—He does not want me—He is not there.19
The relevance to our discussion of the Belief Plus view is straightforward. 
Mother Teresa’s faith persevered through various kinds of challenges 
during her five decades of service to the poor in Calcutta from 1949 until 
her death, including through the profound and serious doubts she expe-
rienced during this period. The serious doubts that she expressed during 
this period, including doubts about whether God exists and other content 
she takes to be part of the core Christian teachings, are so significant that 
they are arguably incompatible with believing. So, the Belief Plus view is 
mistaken: faith does not require believing. I call this the Mother Teresa Ob-
jection.20 To see how this relates to the Problem of Doubt, we can run this as 
a sub-argument for premise (2):
(2.1) Mother Teresa is an exemplar of Christian faith.
(2.2) If someone is in serious doubt about p, then she lacks belief that p. 
(by definition of being in serious doubt)
(2.3) Mother Teresa found herself in serious doubt about the salient 
content of Christianity. (see her letters)
(2.4) Mother Teresa lacked belief of the salient content of Christianity. 
(from 2.2 and 2.3)
(2.5) So, Mother Teresa had Christian faith but lacked belief of the sa-
lient content of Christianity. (from 2.1 and 2.4)
I take premise (2.1) to be a widely held and relatively uncontroversial 
claim. The Catholic Church, for example, officially claims her as a saint 
and she is widely seen as an exemplar of Christian faith with few peers 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. But acceptance of (2.1) need in 
no way appeal to alleged authorities. The idea is rather that in theorizing 
about faith we should start by looking at exemplars, or individuals widely 
regarded as candidate exemplars, and then try to understand how faith 
works in those cases. Apart from specific attempts to resist the conclusion 
of the Problem of Doubt or occasional and highly controversial claims that 
her letters suggest that Mother Teresa was a closet atheist, I have seldom 
heard people deny (2.1) whether they admire her or not. Premise (2.2) just 
says what it means to be in serious doubt. For support of (2.3), see her 
19Undated letter from Mother Teresa to Father Joseph Neuner, S. J., probably during the 
retreat of April 1961. Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 349.
20McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk.”
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letters. (2.4) follows from (2.2) and (2.3) by modus ponens. And (2.5) follows 
from (2.1) and (2.4).
What of the key premise (2.3), the claim that there are times during 
which she lacked belief of propositions that she took to be part of the sa-
lient content of Christianity, including that God exists and that there are 
souls? If a person is in “serious doubt” about whether p, in the sense that I 
stipulate, then she does not believe that p. So there is a legitimate question 
about whether Mother Teresa is a good example of someone who found 
herself with serious doubts about salient content of Christianity, as I take 
her to be. In an undated letter addressed to Jesus enclosed with her confes-
sions to Father Picachy on September 3, 1959, she writes:
They say people in hell suffer eternal pain because of the loss of God—they 
would go through all that suffering if they had just a little hope of possessing 
God.—In my soul I feel just that terrible pain of loss—of God not wanting 
me—of God not being God—of God not really existing (Jesus, please forgive 
my blasphemies—I have been told to write everything). That darkness that 
surrounds me on all sides—I can’t lift my soul to God—no light or inspira-
tion enters my soul.—I speak of love for souls—of tender love for God—
words pass through my words [sic, lips]—and I long with a deep longing 
to believe them.—What do I labour for? If there be no God—there can be no 
soul.—If there is no soul then Jesus—You also are not true.21
The content of the doubts here expressed explicitly include “God not re-
ally existing” and other items she takes to follow from it: “If there be no 
God—there can be no soul.—If there is no soul then Jesus—You also are 
not true.” And the level of doubt seems serious: She reluctantly reports 
experiencing doubts of a level so profound that she worried that even to 
articulate them is blasphemous. Rather than saying that she believes in the 
reality of God and souls, she can say only that “I long with a deep longing 
to believe them.”
In another letter addressed to Jesus, sent to Father Picachy on July 3, 
1959, she writes:
Lord, my God, who am I that You should forsake me? . . . I call, I cling, I 
want—and there is no One to answer—no One on Whom I can cling—no, 
No One.—Alone. The darkness is so dark—and I am alone.—Unwanted, 
forsaken.—The loneliness of the heart that wants love is unbearable.—
Where is my faith?—even deep down, right in, there is nothing but empti-
ness & darkness.—My God—how painful is this unknown pain. It pains 
without ceasing.—I have no faith.—I dare not utter the words & thoughts 
that crowd in my heart—& make me suffer untold agony. So many unan-
swered questions live within me—I am afraid to uncover them—because of 
the blasphemy.—If there be God, please forgive me.—Trust that all will end 
in Heaven with Jesus.—When I try to raise my thoughts to Heaven—there is 
such convicting emptiness that those very thoughts return like sharp knives 
& hurt my very soul.—Love—the word—it brings nothing.—I am told God 
21Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 192–193.
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loves me—and yet the reality of darkness & coldness & emptiness is so great 
that nothing touches my soul.22
There are also places in which she says that she lacks the belief that there 
are souls—a proposition which she takes to be central to Christian teaching 
and the falsity of which (as we see above) she thinks would imply that 
Jesus “is not true” and that there is no heaven.
He is not there. Heaven, souls—why these are just words—words that mean 
nothing to me.—My very life seems so contradictory. I help souls—to go 
where?23
As part of her retreat notes from March 29 to April 12, 1959 she writes:
Do I value the salvation of my soul? I don’t believe I have a soul. There is 
nothing in me. Am I working in earnest for the salvation of the souls of oth-
ers? There was a burning zeal in my soul for souls from childhood until I 
said “yes” to God & then all is gone. Now I don’t believe.24
Her condition is such that, with respect to questions about whether there 
are souls or whether there really is a God, she can say only “Now I don’t 
believe,” “I want to believe” and “I long with a deep longing to believe 
them.” This condition seems to have spanned years. Even in 1965, in a 
letter to Archbishop Knox on June 19, she writes: “And because I want to 
believe, I accept the darkness of faith with greater joy and confidence.”25
The case for (2.3), then, looks strong. There are two main ways that 
proponents of the Belief Plus view can resist the Mother Teresa Objection 
as a route to establishing premise (2) of the Problem of Doubt: either deny 
(2.1) that Mother Teresa had faith or claim that she did not lack belief by 
downplaying the alleged seriousness of her doubts in (2.3). Alternatively, 
one might just deny (2.4) and maintain that she believed but that either 
the beliefs or doubts were irrational. But cases of irrationality are less in-
teresting philosophically.26
Proponents of the Belief Plus view of faith might be tempted to insist 
that, despite what she says, throughout this period deep down Mother 
Teresa did believe all of the propositions that she took to be part of the 
salient content, including that God exists and that there are souls. But what 
evidence is there for such a claim? Given the kind of evidence we have just 
seen above, which strongly suggests otherwise, I don’t find this response 
22Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 186–188.
23Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 210.
24Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 349.
25Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 253.
26If you think that we should say either that the real Mother Teresa was irrational or that 
she was not in serious doubt, then consider Mother Teresa* who is in all respects otherwise 
like Mother Teresa, except that she is more rational or has slightly more serious doubts. 
Here’s how that would change the sub-argument for (2). Rather than arguing that “what’s 
actual is possible, and Mother Teresa is an actual case of (2)” the argument would be “Here’s 
a case of Mother Teresa* such that it is (arguably) not plausible to deny that she has faith and 
yet (by stipulation) does lack the relevant beliefs.”
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plausible. The comforting suggestion that Mother Teresa’s belief in God 
never wavered radically underestimates the source and depth of expressed 
anguish we see in her now publicly available writings.27 Notice, however, 
that it also seems hard for this response to avoid the implication that her 
faith is epistemically defective. Believing on insufficient evidence is epis-
temically defective and, insofar as her doubts were well-grounded, this 
interpretation makes it difficult to avoid seeing Mother Teresa as clinging 
dogmatically, perhaps even simplemindedly, to her beliefs on insufficient 
evidence, even in the face of significant counterevidence. Moreover, so as 
not to risk trivializing just how deep her doubts ran, we do well to bear 
in mind how reluctant Mother Teresa was to speak of the darkness that 
she was experiencing. She rarely spoke of these matters and shared what 
she did only in obedience to and at the direction of her confessor. Mother 
Teresa eventually found the more plausible and quite beautiful turn of 
phrase “to live by faith and yet not to believe” to describe her spiritual 
condition in a letter to Father Neuner on May 17, 1964.
Pray for me—for the life within me is harder to live. To be in love & yet not 
to love, to live by faith and yet not to believe. To spend myself and yet be in 
total darkness.—Pray for me.28
Another way of questioning whether any of the serious doubts she 
found herself with were really directed at the existence of God, or other 
salient content of Christianity, situates Mother Teresa in the mystical 
tradition. Mother Teresa took herself to have had a heightened religious 
experience or series of experiences, particularly in 1946–1947, which she 
understood to be interactions with Jesus and/or God. One can see how 
it might be that, even through trials or feelings of abandonment by God 
that she would later experience, a confident belief in the reality of God 
persisted—anchored in or reinforced by those earlier experiences. On this 
reading, the doubts that Mother Teresa expresses should be understood as 
directed at something other than questioning the reality of God, perhaps 
as doubts about some aspect of God’s character such as God’s trustworthi-
ness or love for her while her belief that God exists never wavered and 
remained firmly intact. However, it is not clear that Mother Teresa’s own 
27But suppose you are unconvinced or think that the limited evidence Mother Teresa has 
left us cannot decisively rule out either of these interpretations. What turns on this for our 
present philosophical discussion? Suppose that one could show that the real Mother Teresa 
doesn’t illustrate exemplary faith in the absence of belief. There might yet be other sub-
arguments for (2) worth considering. Consider, for example, Mother Teresa**, someone in 
other respects very much like the real Mother Teresa, who also struggles with serious doubts 
of the sort I am focused on. If the real Mother Teresa was a mystic, who enjoyed a powerful 
encounter with God that left her without any doubt as to God’s existence, then she might in 
that respect be even more unlike many of the rest of us than Mother Teresa**. But again, I 
don’t concede that my reading of Mother Teresa is incorrect. And to the extent that we can 
illustrate the points that we want to make with real-life cases that are at least in the neighbor-
hood of the sort of faith under consideration, our philosophical reflections on this topic will 
be all the more rich, interesting, and experientially grounded.
28Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 248.
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writings bear out this interpretation. Moreover, it is easy to see how a 
prolonged sense of the absence of God, particularly as one is daily en-
countering extreme suffering, might understandably lead someone to 
have intellectual doubts about whether those earlier experiences one took 
to be experiences of the presence of God were veridical (i.e., are open to 
plausible alternative naturalistic interpretations).
If denying (2.3) doesn’t look particularly promising, proponents of the 
Belief Plus view might be pressed to look for ways to deny (2.1). What of 
the suggestion that Mother Teresa lost her faith? There are, after all, a few 
places where she says herself “I have no faith—I don’t believe.”29 That 
is just what we might expect someone struggling with serious doubt to 
say, if they have long been immersed in community in which there is a 
widespread tendency to assume that belief is required for faith.
Where is my Faith?—Even deep down, right in, there is nothing but empti-
ness and darkness.—My God—how painful is this unknown pain—I have 
no Faith—I dare not utter the words & thoughts that crowd in my heart—& 
make me suffer untold agony.30
On this view, the claim would be that Mother Teresa’s faith did not per-
severe continuously through the challenges she faced from 1949 to 1997. 
There were moments when she did not believe salient content and, there-
fore, lost her faith.
Alternatively, proponents of the Belief Plus view might maintain that 
Mother Teresa was a pillar of faith in terms of an overall assessment of 
her life and work and yet that she went through extended periods of time 
when she carried on even though she had lost her faith. One could thus 
grant (2.1), or something in the neighborhood of (2.1), while insisting that 
Mother Teresa lacked faith at every moment that she lacked belief of sa-
lient content presupposed by such faith.
Each of these two ways of finessing one’s stance on (2.1) involves inter-
pretations and judgments about Mother Teresa’s religious struggles that 
I think are incorrect. But perhaps the available information alone does 
not decisively rule out such alternatives. For example, someone already 
firmly committed to the Belief Plus view might simply insist that insofar as 
Mother Teresa experienced serious doubts about salient content, during 
those times by definition she lacked Christian faith. Those of us theorizing 
about the nature of faith face decisions about how best to balance the ex-
tent to which we allow our accounts of faith to be shaped by consideration 
of specific cases or allow our preconceived general ideas about faith to dic-
tate judgments about whether or not Mother Teresa had faith. But unless 
someone who replies in this way can offer both an independent defense 
of the Belief Plus view and plausible interpretations of texts such as those 
29Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 193.
30Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 187.
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under consideration, we might worry that it is simply held dogmatically, in 
a way that isn’t open to testing or revision in light of particular examples.
Notice some potential costs one takes on board when one maintains that 
Mother Teresa’s faith lapsed during her moments of serious doubt. Are 
we to say that Mother Teresa is better classified as an atheist or agnostic 
during those times (whether or not one maintains that she is an exemplar 
of faith overall), perhaps frequently popping in and out of faith in ways 
that track day-to-day fluctuations in her level of confidence? Given that 
there is some reason to think that the prolonged darkness Mother Teresa 
describes never lifted, can proponents of the Belief Plus view square that 
with the claim that she was nevertheless a pillar of faith?
Moreover, if we take on board the idea that Mother Teresa lacked faith—
perhaps over this entire period—what shall we make of the fact that many 
of the letters in which these doubts are expressed are addressed to Jesus or 
to the Lord, cast in the form of prayers, and are—despite lacking a feeling 
of God’s presence—intermingled with expressions of complete surrender 
and resolutions to continue to say “Yes” to God: “I am ready to wait for 
You for all eternity.—Your little one”?31 To say that her faith lapsed during 
these extended periods of doubt, despite their coexistence with these sorts 
of profound expressions of submission to God, is to set the bar for having 
and maintaining not just ideal faith but any faith at all rather high. To deny 
that she persevered in faith, despite the fact that her attitude toward God 
was to remain steadfastly and unwaveringly “at His disposal” throughout 
all of these years, is to insist on using the word “faith” in such a way that 
might call into question its relevance for describing the sort of response 
that God is said to desire of humans. This is a woman who had committed 
to following Jesus come what may, and it is spectacularly implausible to 
deny that Mother Teresa had faith.32
So what of the question: Are you a “believer”? I do not doubt that 
Mother Teresa would have been happy if you could answer yes. But those 
who insist that faith requires belief would do well to hear her words:
Jesus has a very special love for you. As for me—the silence and the empti-
ness is so great that I look and do not see, listen and do not hear.33
As she understood herself, throughout the period from 1949 until her 
death in 1997 she kept her promise “never to refuse” Jesus, even during 
those periods through which she appears to have had serious doubts 
about what she took to be salient content of Christianity. In Mother Teresa, 
I have argued, even in the absence of belief, faith lives on:
31Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 192–194.
32See also McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged Risk” and McKaughan, “On 
the Value of Faith and Faithfulness.”
33Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 288.
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And now even in this hard and deep darkness— . . . [God] has destroyed ev-
erything in me. The only thing that keeps me on the surface—is obedience.34
6. Missing in Action Cases and the Value of Perseverance
Part of what motivates the Belief Plus view starts from the thought that 
you can’t sensibly place your trust in Santa Claus, if you believe that Santa 
does not exist. That’s right. But, again, don’t confuse disbelieving p (be-
lieving not-p) with mere lack of belief that p. Sometimes we have to act in 
situations of considerable uncertainty. Quite generally, for some person or 
object X, relevant domain F, and presupposed content p, one can both trust 
in X (as an F) and one can trust that p, without believing that p.
Consider a non-religious example of faith at work on the level of or-
dinary human relations. In Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Odysseus tries to 
return to his wife Penelope after the decade-long Trojan War. His journey 
home from the siege takes another ten years. Consider Penelope’s point 
of view. When Odysseus departs, she trusts in her husband as a faithful 
spouse and as a courageous warrior. She also knows that he exists. We 
can use a case like this to explore the essence of faith, allowing that 
during those twenty years of absence her faith is challenged in all kinds 
of ways.
Does Penelope’s faith in Odysseus as a faithful spouse require belief 
that Odysseus is faithful? Her allegiance to him clearly does not require it. 
Reliance also takes the form of actions that remain available to her even 
given significant doubt, risk, and uncertainty. Trust is, like belief, a more 
disputed notion. But there are forms of action-oriented trust available to 
Penelope which also do not require belief.35 Penelope could (1) act on the 
assumption that Odysseus will be faithful (acting in ways that are worthy 
of her trust and doing for her what he knows that she wants or needs), 
(2) when the evidence gives her some reason for supposing that Odys-
seus may not be faithful, and (3) where there will be bad consequences 
and she will feel betrayed if her assumption is false. Such trust leaves her 
vulnerable, both with respect to what is at stake and with respect to her 
epistemic situation. She is not naïve. Might not Odysseus have already 
betrayed her trust in him? Is it likely that a strapping champion such as he 
could resist the siren calls of beautiful young maids and goddesses all that 
time? Nevertheless, she continues to place her trust in Odysseus and to 
rely on him, such that, if he is alive, he will remain faithful to his promises 
and make every effort to return to her.
But does Penelope’s faith in Odysseus or faith that he exists require 
belief that Odysseus exists? Arguably not. Circumstances change. New evi-
dence is introduced. And now the question: “Is he even alive?” becomes 
pressing. Some reports of Odysseus’s death or capture raise significant 
34Kolodiejchuk, Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light, 191.
35Swinburne, Faith and Reason, 143. McKaughan, “Authentic Faith and Acknowledged 
Risk” and McKaughan, “Action-Centered Faith.”
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and reasonable doubts about whether he is still alive. Suppose that the 
new evidence is strong enough to make it unreasonable for her to believe 
that Odysseus is alive, but not so conclusive as to make it unreasonable 
not to believe that he is dead. Can Penelope persevere in faith? Could you? 
There is no conceptual difficulty here. Penelope could, for example, (1) act 
on the assumption that Odysseus is alive, (2) when the evidence gives 
her some reason for supposing that Odysseus may not be alive, (3) where 
there will be bad consequences if her assumption is false, and where (4) 
her commitment to such actions is contingent on Odysseus’s existence in 
such a way that learning that Odysseus is not alive would cause her to lose 
or abandon her faith. Her doubts might present motivational challenges 
or temptations that she would be less inclined to face if she had good 
evidence that Odysseus is alive. And maybe it would take a kind of heroic 
and admirable grit for Penelope’s faith to persevere in the face of such 
challenges. But none of that implies that she cannot continue in faith in the 
absence of belief that Odysseus is alive.
There is a difference between Penelope’s situation (hoping that someone 
she once knew to be alive and well will safely return from war) and Ariel’s 
(coming to be in doubt about whether God has ever existed all). But what 
turns on it? The Penelope example illustrates that a central part of what 
it is to have faith in a context in which doubts about the existence of the 
object toward which one’s faith is directed are pressing can consist pri-
marily in remaining faithful by attempting to continue to engage in the 
relationship in various ways. If Penelope (or a child who has never met her 
biological mother) can do this, even while merely hoping that Odysseus 
is alive while being painfully aware of the fact that she could be mistaken, 
why couldn’t Ariel do something similar while having doubts about the 
existence of God? For someone who takes a vow to God as the result of 
a heightened religious experience that she takes to be an encounter with 
God and then ceases to have this experience, such experiences could 
continue to serve as grounds for remaining committed much in the same 
way Penelope does. Similarly, someone who makes a commitment to God 
while believing that God exists might continue to honor that commitment 
after losing this belief.
But what about religiously interested doubters whose faith did not 
originate in this way? Is it even possible, psychologically or rationally, for 
someone to decide to commit to God while lacking the belief that God 
exists? I think that it is (keeping in mind that there is a difference between 
lacking the belief that p and being committed to its denial). It is crucial to see 
that the responses at the core of Relational Faith are actions (e.g., deciding 
to follow Jesus or to commit to pursuing a way of life called to mind by the 
phrase “walking in God’s ways” and/or trusting in or relying on others in 
ways that involve decisions to act). Even if Ariel, or someone who comes 
to be in her state by a different route, finds it difficult to initially commit 
or to remain committed directly to God in such circumstances, in the case 
of Christianity one might, for example, place one’s trust in people who 
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once lived (such as Jesus of Nazareth or in the authors of the New Testa-
ment) and, on that basis, trust that the message proclaimed—including the 
proposition that God exists—is true. (If Christianity is true and there is a 
life to come, Ariel might even come to see her previous actions as having 
related herself in certain ways to Christ, even if she could not be confident 
in that at the time.) Anthony Kenny takes it that an agnostic praying to 
a God whose existence he doubts is “surely no more unreasonable than 
the act of a man adrift in the ocean, trapped in a cave, or stranded on a 
mountainside, who cries for help though he may never be heard or fires 
a signal which may never be seen.”36 More recently, Shieva Kleinschmidt 
has challenged the idea that atheists cannot pray, using similar cases in 
which people direct communication to someone whom they believe does 
not exist to argue not only that “it is possible for an atheist to direct com-
munication toward God, though they believe God does not exist” but also 
that “if God exists, atheistic prayer may allow atheists to communicate 
with God and form a lasting and evolving relationship with Him, all while 
believing that God does not exist.”37
Many of the same forms of active commitment and response that con-
stitute the heart of Relational Faith are available to Penelope and to Ariel or 
other religiously interested doubters, just as they were to Mother Teresa. 
In Homer’s epic poem, suitors challenge the most concrete expression of 
Penelope’s faith: her own faithfulness. Penelope chooses not to remarry 
but, in spite of all her doubts, to await Odysseus’s return. Her faith in 
Odysseus, as expressed in the form of life she adopts, does stake every-
thing on his existence. She recognizes all too painfully the real possibility 
that he has perished and will never return. But if her love is great enough, 
if she deems this hope good enough and important enough to risk her life 
on, it seems clear to me that she could do this—remain steadfast in the 
faith she has placed in Odysseus—even where her opinion about whether 
he is alive has diminished to a mere hope that it is so.38
Notice that there is something of value here that Penelope’s faith couldn’t 
have if it required belief: a much wider range of resilience. We can see why 
Odysseus would care about a faith that can persevere through hardships, 
challenges, and significant uncertainties like that. Odysseus might well 
recognize what a precious good his wife’s response adds to their relation-
ship while he is struggling to make his way home and upon his return.
Let me close with some remarks about how we should understand resil-
ience. Clearly there is value in a faith that perseveres through challenges. 
But can a faith that perseveres through specifically evidential challenges 
and counterevidence be valuable? The valuable resilience of faith, even 
in the face of intellectual challenges, needs to be carefully distinguished 
36Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, 129.
37Kleinschmidt, “Atheistic Prayer,” 164 and 153.
38For a hint about how she could do this in a way that comports with standard criteria for 
epistemic and practical rationality, see n. 4 above.
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from something with which it is often confused but which is clearly not of 
value: believing on insufficient evidence.
Regrettably, all too often through the centuries people have tried to cap-
ture the resilience of faith in terms of maximal belief or confidence. Calvin, 
for example, follows Aquinas in taking it that faith “must be sure and 
firm,” requiring certainty of a kind ordinarily appropriate only to matters 
about which we have knowledge grounded in direct experience or proof.39 
Kierkegaard enjoins the knight of faith to be subjectively certain about 
matters that are objectively uncertain (or even absurd or paradoxical).40 
What’s of value here is misidentified or, at best, misleadingly described 
and with damaging consequences. Certainty in such circumstances is a 
poor substitute for the resilience that paradigm cases of faith involve—for 
the noble ways in which, having set our heart on someone or something, 
we might hold fast in our loyalty to and reliance on God with firm-
ness and grit, even where nothing even remotely close to certainty is 
to be found.
We should acknowledge that believing on insufficient evidence is prob-
lematic.41 Sometimes a degree of tenacity even in our beliefs is important 
and perhaps in some circumstances we do well to allow moral concerns, 
or our goals and values all-things-considered, to override narrowly epis-
temic ones.42 But even if there are exceptions like that we should tread 
carefully here, taking care to avoid holding our epistemic opinions dog-
matically, in a way that is insensitive to counterevidence.
With faith of a sort that does not assume that faith requires believing, 
such as Relational Faith, we are free to seek truth wherever it is to be found 
in a way that is sensitive to our evidence. So long as the particular claims 
of Christianity remain so much as a live option for you, not only can you 
have faith, but you can remain epistemically rational in doing so. In de-
ciding how to act, we quite properly take not only our epistemic opinions 
about how likely it is that the possible states of affairs under consideration 
obtain, but also how much we care about and value the various courses 
of action we are considering in light of those possibilities. If you love God 
39Calvin, Institutes III, ii, 15. Aquinas takes propositional faith to involve a voluntary act 
of intellectual assent (credere) with a fearless certitude, maximal firmness, or adherence ap-
propriate to scientific knowledge (scientia). But the conviction involved in faith is not based 
on objective evidence: faith is needed precisely on matters with respect to revealed proposi-
tions which are not evident to us on the basis of reason or argument (see Summa Theologiae 
IIaIIae Q. 5, Art. 2).
40Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 177–188.
41There are all sorts of ways that believing on insufficient evidence is problematic (e.g., 
from internalist, externalist, individual, and social perspectives in epistemology or on moral 
grounds, etc.). Here is one sense in which you might think that it is problematic from a first-
person voluntarist point of view. The main point of adopting epistemic opinions finds its 
place in the context of an activity aimed at reaching a sober assessment of how likely it is that 
propositions we care about are true or false, given our evidence. Believing on insufficient 
evidence frustrates this aim.
42Preston-Roedder, “Faith in Humanity.”
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enough and are committed to following Jesus and walking in God’s ways, 
this can also be practically rational for almost any nonzero probability.43
In this way, a dynamic interplay between the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral aspects of faith/faithfulness can confer a durability or resilience 
on faith that gives it such value in relationships.44 And the core of that re-
sponse—one’s continuing allegiance and trust in or reliance on God—can 
take the form of voluntary actions that remain directly under your con-
trol. Even in those moments of life when light is overtaken by darkness, 
when storms threaten to wash everything away, when thorns threaten to 
choke out tiny seeds of faith sown along the path, and when it’s hard to 
see through the glass even dimly, though belief be weak or even absent, 
faith may yet be strong.45
Boston College
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